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Abstract. We propose a novel Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) which would base its
knowledge and operation on a higher level of abstraction than the processing of the contents
of the network packets audit data themselves which is the source of data on which most
current and proposed Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) base themselves on. We focus on
what is actually being asked of the system, and use that understanding together with research
on prediction based systems to build a specification based Intrusion Prevention System based
on the patterns extracted from higher level application or operating system logs.
1 Introduction
While the world of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) technologies and methodologies for detecting
attacks seem to move ahead at the speed of light, this is not quite the case. By observing a report
commissioned in 2000 by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) [12] coupled with my experience
in the security field for over four years, one would be able to notice that the systems used for
IDS have not developed so much. Granted, features and functionality are being integrated into
products rapidly, however the methodologies used in detecting attacks did not adhere to such a
tight schedule. All detection mechanisms used to expose illicit activity on a network can be broken
down into two main categories which do not overlap. These are Pattern Matching and Anomaly
Detection.
Pattern Matching based IDS work by looking for patterns/signatures in the information data they
are processing in order to detect attacks. When a pattern in the data fits a signature the system
would issue an alert to the security administrator. As a direct result of this operational method,
pattern matching based solutions are generally effective at detecting known current intrusion meth-
ods, but quite ineffective against novel or new attacks until a signature for that new attack method
is released.
Anomaly Detection based IDS work by establishing a “normal” operating method of a system.
They create patterns of usage of that machine. When some action/activity happens outside of the
normal operational usage patterns, it would trigger an intrusion alert. Anomaly Based IDS, unlike
Pattern Matching IDS are generally quite good at detecting novel attacks but can have a tendency
to generate many false positives as a result of “off the normal” legitimate actions which a user of a
system might perform. From personal experience we came to think that unlike several marketing
campaigns claim, all IDSs on the market use some combination of the above methodologies for
detecting attacks using different types of data sources.
In this paper we will be analyzing the reasons why a security administrator of an organiza-
tion/networked system would require an Intrusion Detection System as part of their standard
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collection of tools which are required for the proper daily operation of their administration and
resource security enforcement job. However we will not stop there. After making a case on the
importance of having an IDS and how they contribute to close “holes” inside a network setup,
we will also proceed to analyze how totally unrelated (non IDS) tools, which a typical high end
administrator uses in his daily task of administration and integrity keeping of his network can be
used in order to create a system which based on IDS technology can actually be used to create an
Intrusion Prevention System – an IDS with the capability to react based on intelligent information
processing. This will allow the tool not only to detect an intruder but will also be able to stop the
intruder point blank during the course of an attack.
We will be covering both common methods through which an attacker compromises an operating
system for his own current and future needs, as well as analyze what is being done by security
engineers and experts in order to learn how attacks are being made directly from the source, i.e.
the attackers themselves without paying them or promising rewards. This system/method used is
called a HoneyPot/HoneyNet [15] and is proving to be very useful to a security administrator who
wants to be instantly aware of new attack techniques/variations of already existing attacks that
are being used.
We will also be covering details on the pitfalls which we are expected to find on the road and how we
will be addressing these issues such as noise in the information domain, the size of the information
domain and how this data can be formatted to enable information coming from different sources
and software products to contribute to the creation of the IPS intelligence.
At the end of the paper we will also be mentioning a novel intrusion prevention method which is
aimed at blocking a specific type of attack – buffer overflow attacks which is still in the research
phase.
2 The Need For Securing Resources
Any computer user has heard the buzzword “security” and the need to protect the information
contained on a private computer from prying eyes. The main problem to be replied in most if not
all cases is “How can this be achieved ?”. From experience, a security aware administrator knows
that the best solution is to deploy defenses on a network in a layered manner – not one defense
mechanism, but many different types and at different levels addressing different monitoring needs.
These defenses include the deployment of secure operating systems, the creation and deployment
of security policies, vulnerability scanning, patching, access control and authentication, encryption,
program wrappers, firewalls, intrusion detection, and intrusion response, and also disaster recovery
software/procedures as well as proper configuration of the operating system features and services to
support the required security policies. Although this list is quite long a security aware administrator
would also be required to train the people making use of the system in order to ensure that the
secure system remains secure. Irrespective how many systems/policies one would deploy all of them
will be nullified by a user of the system who does not understand and follow the security practices
required. For e.g. a user with an easily guessable password like “love”, name of wife, name of car etc
can nullify all of the security measures implemented since an intruder would use those credentials
to make use of the system resources. More information on the dangers of weak passwords and how
they can be prevented/enforced by an operating system based security policy can be found at [13].
With the developing complexities and improvements of operating system, security software, security
standards and the need of people to know what is going on their network, the need to provide
more human readable and processed data was required. This data is the first point of reference a
security administrator would run to in order to check out what is going on the network, on the first
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suspicion of an intrusion/abnormal/not-desired activity. This data takes the form of logs, which
are outputted from all of the above mentioned types of software which are used to enforce security
and understand what happened on that system in order to correct the security measures on that
PC and prevent such incidents in the future.
Given a multilayered type of network security deployment even in a moderately sized network of
20 computers would generate more information and logs which an administrator would find heavy
difficulties in be able to keep up with in order to monitor the daily activity on the network. From
our own personal experience in the field, these logs are typically only accessed depending on the
problems/reports encountered as the days go by. However this means that if a suspicion is in place
the attack may have already been done and executed, which in itself may be too late to protect
against for this attack, however on a brighter side the information collected from this attack may
be used to prevent future similar attacks.
Current IDSs might inform a user that an intrusion has occurred, however to find out how this was
done, an administrator would still be required to delve into these operational/trace logs to look
for some indication on what mis-configuration/vulnerability was used by the intruder. Even more
worse, without any form of monitoring a user might have left some files/tools around the operating
system purposely. These files may be used to hide the actions performed or even worse replace
normal operating system files containing custom backdoors in order to enable easier access on fu-
ture attacks without being detected. Unfortunately, without total monitoring/detailed protections,
once a system is compromised (after a successful intrusion), without a proper prevention system,
the entire system would have to be re-installed from scratch in order to ensure the integrity of a
computer system. This is the main concept used by RootKits to take control of a system. These
kits are developed specifically to operate at the kernel level rendering them fully capable access
everything and everywhere while being able to hide the operations of an attacker from the unwit-
ting security administrator. RootKits replace central operating system files giving the impression
that nothing changed, to the naked eye. RootKits can either take the form of Trojans attaching
themselves to files or by totally replacing the original core operating system files with custom made
system files with custom code specifically designed to hide illicit activity on that system by the
attacker. More information on RootKits can be found at [11] and [12]. Special file system level
integrity monitoring and Trojan detection tools can be used to be informed when such sensitive
files are changed. Tools such as Tripwire [8] are used for such file level intrusion change detections.
Even well administered networks are vulnerable to attack. Recent work in network security has
focused on the fact that combinations of exploits are typical means by which an attacker breaks
into a network. [5] Without multiple layers of security software deployed on a system, that very
same system would be just as strong as its weakest point of entry. This creates problems since there
are automated tools through which attackers would simply supply a machine IP, let it operate and
let it report the weaknesses of that system. Based on those weakness reports the attacker would be
able to devise his next steps of attack. A growing tool in the open source community is working on
a project whose output is a tool named Nessus [9] which although designed for administrators to
find the “weakest link” in the security infrastructure of a system, can be itself used by an attacker
to devise his attack pattern in order to go by undetected.
3 NIDS vs. HIDS
In the field of detection of unwanted intruders on a computer network system, there are two main
types of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) which act on different sets of data. Network Intrusion
Detection Systems (NIDS) operate on the network packets audit data being received at the network
point of a machine, while Host Based Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS) work by monitoring the
actual applications behavior on the host and its interactions with the underlying operating system.
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It is a fact that in the past data contained within a packet received at the network level was easier
to access, decode and process. This resulted in a concentration of research and development of
several IDS systems based on the processing of information contained in network data packets. The
literature field also seemed to concentrate most on this type of data. However with the movement
of high speed Ethernet cards from 100Mbs to 1GBps, coupled with the encryption of the data
contained in the packets via the use of technologies such as IPSEC/SSH, it has become increasingly
difficult for NIDS to keep up both the precision at which they can detect intrusions as well as
guarantee the detection of attacks without a high rate of false positives.
In this research task, we are giving Host Based IDS the attention it needs in order to use current
technologies to process as much of the information we may already have already at hand in order to
build patterns and systems, which can actually not only detect, but also prevent attack methods.
In HIDS, the most common approach taken is to monitor relevant interactions between an appli-
cation and an operating system by monitoring the system calls on that operating system. This
resulted in the creation of systems which are based once again on monitoring a pattern of calls
rather than the real logical operations that an attacker would be thinking in order to gain access
to a system. Such a level of analysis also makes it easier for an attacker to hide the tracks of the
attack by mimicking pause periods and fake system calls to hinder system call based HIDS by
applications.
4 Data Mining Applications
Typically most IDS technologies require the use of pattern constructs which are used to either define
attacks/abnormalities. Whether we are working on an IDS or an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS),
we still require the creation of patters via manual Knowledge Engineering from a network/security
expert, or the use and application of modern methodologies to process all of the large amounts of
information, in order to extract patterns which can be monitored and adapted by the knowledge
engineers. Given the complexities of today’s network environments, needs and the sophistication
of the increasingly hostile attacks the knowledge constructed based outputted from the knowledge
engineer only is often limited and unreliable [1]. Data Mining applications is a field which is directly
addressed towards large data set information grouping and searching. Data mining is an area which
can offer large opportunities to the refining of the pattern matching rules used by IDS.
“Data mining tasks and algorithms refer to the essential procedure where intelligent methods are
applied to extract useful information patterns from huge data sets. There are many data mining
tasks such as clustering, classification, regression, content retrieval and visualization etc. Each task
can be thought as a particular kind of problem to be solved by a data mining algorithm. Generally
there are many different algorithms which could serve the purpose of the same task. Meanwhile
some algorithms can be applied to different tasks”[16].
5 Pre-Processing
As mentioned earlier in the paper, we are proposing the creation of a specification based IPS based
on the patterns which are extracted from the various forms of logs which are outputted from all of
the various types of software mentioned earlier on. However this is not as simple as it might sound.
Most of the logs which are output from the various applications are proprietary and not conforming
to a specific standard of any form. This means that the information contained is essentially different
from one log to another. What makes this task even more complicated is that different logs will
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offer different views to the system. In essence this task involved the analysis of various types of
log files in order to help find commonalities and also group different type of logs in order to help
create a framework which would allow the attainment of our aims.
Another aspect which is involved in log analysis is the inherent noise, missing values and inconsistent
data in the actual information contained and written in the logs. It is a fact that all attackers know
that all applications are vulnerable in some form of another. During research we also came across
situations whereby attackers found and used methods which by supplying say a firewall with a
particular type of data (in UNICODE format) they could literally crash the firewall and hence
have absolute access to the system, as well as hide details of their activity since the firewall was
not logging the information coming from the source of the attack. A log analyzer suffers from
that very same danger. The importance to transform and process the data supplied to the log
analyzer in a standard format is a key process to the standardization of the logs to be processed
as well as offer an extra layer of protection before actual processing of the data, for e.g. Microsoft
use their Event Viewer for log output, third party tools their own etc. A standard by a security
company named NETIQ proposes a format named the WebTrends Enhanced Log Format (WELF)
format which proposes a standard which is most ideal for large scale text based logs. With this
format we can transform practically every log entry/system call equivalent to a standard format
on which operations will take place. In addition real world data sets tend to be too large and some
multi dimensional. Therefore we need data cleaning to remove noise, data reduction to reduce
the dimensionality and complexity of the data and data transformation to convert the data into
suitable form for mining etc.
6 Common Pitfalls
The use of anomaly detection in practice is hampered by a high rate of false alarms. Specification
based techniques have been shown to produce a low rate of false alarms, but are not as effective
as anomaly detection in detecting novel attacks. While detection of new novel attacks can be
an issue, we are working on a system which will prevent known future attacks which are based
on common methods. As an example in windows operating system environments, it is common
for attacks to originate from the usage of particular sensitive operating system files – cmd.exe,
ftp.exe etc. Indeed these files can be protected by basic file system level protection, however in
large systems, file system based protection is not always possible and may require another type
of level of protection. The rationale is that although an attacker may find a common operating
system weakness, an extra level of protection based on specifications coming from previous analysis
steps can be used to stop the attacker even if the underlying operating system defenses have been
beaten.
7 Modern Techniques Used For Knowledge Discovery
To collect information on the way attackers are using system vulnerabilities, organizations and
research groups are making use of what is called honey pots and empty systems whose function is
to react like a normal operating system, however while giving the impression to the attacker that
they got access to a legitimate system, the attacker is actually revealing his methods, tools and
tricks to a highly monitored and specialized environment based exactly to root out the modern
attacks. These systems are what are known as Honey Pots. The information collected from the
honey pots and nets can be then combined, pre-processed, transformed and processed in order to
devise specifications which can be then fed into our IPS in order to identify activities on a high
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level logistical later and prevent by reacting to/redirecting attackers as we may need in order to
subvert attacks. The simplest form of reaction is to close a connection, however unless the IPS is
capable of detecting complex logistical issues and be able to think on a high level like a user, it
will always be open to further attacks and weaknesses.
8 Being Realistic
For the development of an IPS we have to be able to assume that an attacker can silently take
control of an application/operating system itself without being detected, via some form of social
engineering paradigm or system vulnerability/exploit. Our system must also be able to cater for
the unknown. There are actual penetration methods which can leave no trace in the system call
trace especially if no logging is enabled. For instance exploiting a buffer overflow attack involves
only a change in the control flow of the program, but does not itself cause any system calls to be
invoked and thus no system call based IDS can detect the buffer overrun itself. Since no system
call is made even the operating system would not report anything. Indeed an IDS which monitors
the integrity of the code segment of an application would be able to report such an attack, but
would be difficult to prevent it. Work is being done to see whether a way can be found to block
this type of attack as soon as the MemCpy Command is used.
Contrary to popular belief there is little to be done against such attacks. Fortunately there is little
harm that an attacker can do to the rest of the system without executing any system call. However
this proves the point that different IDSs are required at different levels. An IDS which checks for
the integrity of the code segment of a program can be sufficient to detect such an attack but not
block it/prevent it.
In order to address such attacks and also prevent them were possible we are thinking of applying
the same concept used in the processing of the logs to treat the parameters passed to a system
call as a field entry in the logs. Like that we may be able to perform checks on the parameters
of the call and hence also start preventing buffer overflow attacks even the actual call is executed
by monitoring the request. This part is still in research and treating it as a section for Future
Research.
9 System Implementation
As a result we need to find patters in order to model and understand what a user is effectively using
and doing rather monitor only the patter of operating system calls. Based on the patterns which
are generated either by Knowledge Engineering or patterns resulting from Data Mining Techniques
we can build a Finite State Machine Based System through which we can determine/predict the
next state based on a number of previous states and if our prediction comes to reality also decide
to block the operation from taking place.
Action
(E0, E1, E2, E3) → (E1, E2, E3, E4)
By monitoring a sequence of operations one can already predict the next operation based on past
experience. The real trick in our proposal is to use the past experience patterns not to predict
but to know what is going on on a system secured by our final system. This would allow instant
intrusion prevention if our IDS is intelligent enough to understand and react at levels which are
higher than operating system calls.
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10 Conclusion
In these couple of pages we tried to present an outline of our work, however due to space limitations
we had to skip some details which might have been more illuminating to the shady areas of the
most discussed but yet unknown and mysterious field that is the security section of the computing
world. The research covers various technologies used for security, intrusion detection, prevention,
as well as systems and algorithms used by the above mentioned technologies including automation
data mining systems and algorithms as well as the development of a framework which is operating
system independent to be used for intrusion prevention as a protection against the attackers of
tomorrow.
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